The Arab Quest for Freedom and Dignity: Have Arab Thinkers Been Part of It? by Kassab, Elizabeth Suzanne
The recent Arab uprisings have been an 
unprecedented time of dramatic social 
and political movement. It has also been 
an intense time of debate between par-
ticipants and witnesses of these historic 
events. Among the many questions raised 
in the debates is that of the role of the 
intellectuals, or the lack thereof, in pre-
dicting, contributing to, and participat-
ing in these momentous changes. Have 
Arab thinkers, and particularly the critical 
thinkers among them, been in tune with 
these movements? Or have they been 
totally disconnected from what has been 
brewing in their own societies for many 
years, if not decades? What connections, 
if any, could be noted between contem-
porary Arab intellectual critique and con-
temporary Arab protestation? 1  
Where Are the Arab Intellectuals?
Since the end of 2010, Arab thinkers, art-
ists, and journalists have been comment-
ing and analyzing the recent Arab socio-
political movements, addressing a whole 
range of issues—among them the ques-
tion of the place, or the lack thereof, of 
intellectuals in these movements. 
This question stems from two phenom-
ena: Firstly, the fact that Arab intellectu-
als failed to predict these upheavals; and 
secondly, the absence of intellectual lead-
ers in the unfolding events. Indeed, the 
element of surprise has been one of the 
dominant aspects of the recent events, 
while the absence of central leadership 
has been another. The first aspect, in my 
opinion, is due to the very nature of the 
events themselves, namely as an outburst 
of anger and revolt against accumulated 
injustice and suffering; and the second 
can be explained through the withering-
away of the avant-garde role of the intel-
lectuals over the past decades. But if such 
momentous events were not and could 
not be predicted nor led by intellectuals, 
what are intellectuals for? What have they 
been doing? And what is their role sup-
posed to be, in any case? 
The question of the role and position of 
intellectuals has in the last few decades 
been a major topic of discussion in con-
temporary Arab writings, mostly in con-
nection with the relation of intellectuals to 
power—be it political or financial—relating 
to their institutional work conditions, their 
access to knowledge, the means avail-
able to them for disseminating their work, 
their margins of freedom; as well as in 
teaching, researching, publishing and ex-
pressing their views in general. Questions 
of cooptation, censorship, pauperization, 
and marginalization—but also of pontifi-
cation, cultural and intellectual coloniza-
tion and decolonization, “authentic” local 
knowledge production and alienation—
have been central to these discussions.2 
To these questions are now added that of 
their place in the upheavals: both cogni-
tive and politico-moral. What knowledge—
or more disturbingly, lack thereof—did 
they have of the deep movements in their 
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societies? And what political and moral 
stand are they taking vis-à-vis these move- 
ments today? 
The genuine phenomenon of surprise 
and the factual absence of intellectual 
leadership in the traditional sense might 
confirm a seeming disconnect between 
Arab intellectuals and the socio-political 
movements of their countries. 
However, some knowledge of contempo-
rary Arab thought sheds a different light 
on the intellectual and political histories 
of the modern Arab world. In fact, con-
temporary Arab critical thought shows a 
number of similarities with what we have 
been witnessing on the streets of Arab 
cities, towns, and rural provinces. These 
parallels, between developments in con-
temporary Arab critical thought and the 
characteristics of the current Arab upris-
ings show that intellectuals were very 
much in tune with the deep transforma-
tions of their societies, and that their criti-
cal writings expressed on an intellectual 
level what the protestors are voicing to-
day at the political level. That there was an 
element of surprise, an element of unpre-
dictability, is itself no surprise, rather part 
of the very nature of such overwhelming 
outbursts of anger and protest after long 
periods of repression and accumulated 
suffering. I contend that intellectual criti-
cal thinking will never be enough to start 
revolutions. These will have to come from 
some other quarters of human agency, 
namely from the basic human revolt 
against injustice and humiliation. There 
might not be a simple linear causal con-
nection between the two levels of expres-
sion and action, but there certainly is a 
connection and a comparable reaction to 
commonly lived realities. On both levels, 
what we find is the quest for an empow-
ered sense of self that involves searching 
for self-reflective thought of one’s own, 
and the search for a fair and democratic 
government of one’s own. But if the latter 
quest has become visible on the streets of 
the Arab world, the former has not been 
adequately acknowledged, not even by 
Arabs themselves.
In what follows, I elaborate on at least four 
ways in which the two levels echo one an-
other, including some reflections on the 
significance of intellectual work in the 
post-independence era before, during, 
and after the current uprisings.
a) The Comeback of the Political After a 
Long Wave of Culturalism
Over the past decades, one could see the 
comeback of the political reading of a 
century-and-a-half-old Arab malaise. As is 
well known, Arabs have long been preoc-
cupied with the question of civilizational 
malaise, at least ever since the Napole-
onic invasion of Egypt, as the common 
narrative goes. Questions of civilizational 
decline, renewal, and identity have been 
major preoccupations in their writings 
and debates. Analyses of and remedies 
to the position of weakness in which Ar-
abs found themselves in the face of the 
modern Western invaders proliferated 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Until the 1940s and ’50s, these 
analyses and remedies were to a great ex-
tent political, in the sense that the cause 
of the backwardness as well as the secret 
of progress were seen in terms of politi-
cal justice, i.e. in a system in which rulers 
are held accountable on the basis of con-
stitutional laws. By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury and with a wave of independence in 
the Arab world, this preeminence of the 
political gave way to a more culturalist 
approach to the malaise—a malaise that 
lingered on despite the euphoria of in-
dependence and state- and nation-build-
ing—or perhaps because of this. The old-
new malaise arose primarily from what 
the post-independence states turned out 
to be. Endless debates and writings tried 
to understand the post-independence 
discontent by revisiting cultural heritage 
and by dwelling on issues of authenticity 
and modernization. Early critical voices, 
however, instead emphasized the po-
litical ailments of the post-independence 
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era and denounced the disenfranchise-
ment of the people by these states. But 
still, the dominating and growing current 
was preoccupied with “what was wrong in 
Arab culture,” and numerous works were 
written on tradition, to find in it the causes 
of the present predicament, or on the 
contrary, the promises of the yearned-for 
recovery. It is only in the last two decades 
of the twentieth century that the political 
understanding of the contemporary Arab 
predicament returned to the fore, and 
refocused attention on the workings and 
failures of the post-independent state. It 
is precisely this focus that we find on the 
streets of Arab cities today.
In fact, the 1967 trauma had triggered two 
opposite reactions: on the one hand it 
pushed forward the search for a salvation-
al native ideology that could embody a 
culturally and morally more genuine and 
faithful promise for a better future, name-
ly Islamism; and on the other hand, it 
made the need for a radicalization of cri-
tique ever more pressing, occurring in the 
midst of desperate salvational yearnings, 
culturalist circular reasoning, and ideolog- 
ical fervor. From these critical quarters 
came a renewed emphasis on politics. 
Soon after the 1967 defeat, Syrian writer 
and playwright Saadallah Wannous (1941-
1997) unambiguously defined the malaise 
as being primarily political: Arab societies 
were defeated because people were dis-
enfranchised and prevented from polit-
ical participation, because people had 
lost the freedom to use their critical fac-
ulties, because people were abused by 
corrupt and repressive regimes. This po-
litical reading of the malaise was to grow 
louder toward the end of the century, in 
conferences, interviews, publications, 
and including in a growing body of pris-
on literature, which offered sharp diag-
noses of the workings of the police state. 
Political participation and democracy 
became pressing demands. If good po-
litical governance during the time of the 
nahḍa primarily required constitutional 
rule, focused on the curbing of the power 
of a ruler by fundamental law, after 1967 it 
chiefly meant the affirmation of people’s 
power and people’s rights. Moreover, 
compared to those earlier nahḍa days, 
the need for good political governance 
became more pressing, more vital, often 
literally to preserve life, given the wide-
spread violations of human rights. It was 
no longer a question of an optional pro-
posal to borrow good governance ideas 
from foreign cultures and societies, but 
rather, a real need to secure some level 
of physical and moral integrity in the face 
of pervasive abuse. People took to the 
streets because they no longer wanted 
to be arrested and jailed arbitrarily; to be 
tortured, raped, and killed; to be robbed, 
to be deprived of a future; to be humili-
ated, to be lied to, to be impoverished; to 
be denied education, free expression, po-
litical participation; in a word, to be inca-
pacitated and reduced to insignificance. 
The repressive regimes had incapacitat-
ed their people, and what the people de-
manded—even at the price of risking their 
lives—was empowerment, freedom, and 
dignity. The very concrete incapability of 
people to change anything about their 
reality because of the forbidden avenues 
of action in politics and society had been 
articulated in writings of the years pre-
ceding the uprisings. Indeed, the Arabic 
word for impotence, ʿajz, was one of the 
most ubiquitous terms one finds in these 
writings, whether in fiction, newspaper 
articles, scholarly essays, books, or inter-
views. It expressed the bitter frustration 
of being unable to change a state of af-
fairs that ruined the present and blocked 
the future, along with conveying the deep 
despair that went with it. It is this ʿajz that 
people wanted to overcome by break-
ing the barriers of fear and storming the 
public scene, pushed by exacerbated de-
spair, humiliation, and outrage. Only such 
a concrete political act on the part of the 
people, demonstrating publicly the will 
to force a change, could bring about the 
change that critical intellectuals could ad-
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vocate for and recognize as an indispens-
able step out of the predicament, but 
could not undertake through their intel-
lectual work alone.
Clearly, critical thinkers such as Saadal-
lah Wannous, Abdallah Laroui, Sadiq 
Jalal al-ʿAzm, Constantin Zureiq, Fouad 
Zakariyya, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Hisham 
Sharabi, Abdelkebir Khatibi, and many 
others were not the only ones to sense 
and express this profound discontent—
but they were the ones who articulated 
it in the most sober, lucid, and humanist 
way, drawing attention to the fundamen-
tal human values of freedom and dignity, 
seeing in individual and civil liberties the 
only source of hope and change. They 
warned against totalizing ideologies—
whether religious or secular—resisted in-
tellectual terrorism practiced in the name 
of “Truths,” and criticized the un-reflected 
cult of authenticity. They did engage in 
cultural critique, yet without giving in to 
the culturalism centered around issues 
of authenticity and identity that prevailed 
in the post-1967 era. Indeed, the 1980s 
and ’90s were dominated by a concern 
with tradition and authenticity. Numer-
ous works were produced in revisiting the 
classical heritage (turāth in Arabic), either 
to show that the malaise was due to some 
elements in it and/or to find in it remedies 
for said malaise. In all cases, this malaise 
was understood to be inherently cultural, 
due to, and/or dealing with, some aspect 
of the cultural givens of the Arabs. But 
there was an increasing challenge to this 
approach by thinkers who realized that 
what was wrong with their societies was 
not the cultural per se, but that culture, 
like so much else, suffered from misman-
agement of, if not the forbidding of, the 
political. Eventually, when people took to 
the streets, it was not cultural authentic-
ity or a specific style of life that they de-
manded, but rather, political rights—and 
they demanded them from their own 
governments. Their protestation, their 
criticism, their indignation were directed 
not at external powers, but at their own 
rulers, their own states, their own politi-
cal realities—not because they no longer 
perceived harm from external powers, 
but because their grievance priorities 
had become very clear. By clamoring on 
the streets and squares of their cities, the 
protestors expanded the clarity of these 
priorities and complemented the clarity 
achieved by the intellectuals.
b) The Gaze Turned Inward
Both in contemporary intellectual work 
and in current political contestation, the 
gaze is turned inwards, i.e., toward one’s 
own modes of thinking, acting, ruling, 
and managing of intellectual and polit-
ical affairs. Not so much because exter-
nal harm—whether military, political, eco-
nomic or cultural—has disappeared, but 
rather because of the need for radical 
self-reflection and radical internal pro-
test against domestic problems, such as 
ideological mystification and indoctrina-
tion; the lure of salvational doctrines; the 
deadlocks of a mystified “authenticity”; of 
a mystified Volksgeist found in language, 
religion and/or tradition; essentialist 
views of identity; censorship, oppression, 
misappropriation of public wealth; the 
destruction of educational and cultural 
institutions; pauperization and socio-eco-
nomic polarization; as well as police bru-
tality and absence of the rule of law.
As mentioned earlier, the shifting of cri-
tique from external targets to internal 
ones occurred on the intellectual level af-
ter independence, once sovereign states 
became established and were later ap-
propriated by long-lasting regimes run by 
individuals or families. It was deepened 
by the defeat of 1967 and the growing 
malaise of the subsequent decades. This 
is what I call the “critical turn” in post-in-
dependence Arab thought.  Interestingly, 
it is a turn that we witness in other de-
bates about cultural and political malaise 
in other parts of the ex-colonized world, 
for instance in Africa and Latin America. 
In the modern intellectual history of these 
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regions, we find a moment when past ap-
proaches to cultural and political decolo-
nization are reassessed and reconsid-
ered, when past struggles of intellectual 
and political liberation are revisited and 
revalued. In this turn, the focus of atten-
tion has shifted from the external other, 
the colonizer—on whom one had been fix-
ated, in the effort to compare oneself to it, 
emulate it, fight it, and free oneself from 
it—to what one has been doing with one-
self in the process. Then, internal libera-
tion policies are reexamined and emanci-
pation concepts are rethought. 
It is interesting to note that in the critical 
turn one finds in all three regions a shift 
of emphasis from essence to agency, 
from identity to democracy, and from ide-
ology to critique. The first shift happens 
with the discovery of the deadlocks of a 
deterministic view of identity, in which 
characteristics of the self (primarily the 
cultural collective self) are set and fixed 
outside history, constituting a solid image 
of the self that is firm and invulnerable, 
but which leaves no room for people’s 
actions, choices, and responsibilities. 
Contrary to this view, critical thinkers de-
fend a non-deterministic view of identity 
in which human agency is central, and in 
which identity remains in the making. The 
second shift occurs with the rising con-
cern for personal and civil liberties, with 
the growing demand for accountability in 
the exercise of power, and the pressing 
need for rule of law. Identity as a sense 
of empowered self remains relevant, but 
this sense is sought in the practice of criti-
cal faculties and in political participation 
rather than in a set of fixed features. Final-
ly, the third shift comes with the demise 
of pre-set views about reality and change, 
and the discrediting of concepts such as 
socialism, Arabism, and even Islamism, 
which had been claimed by post-inde-
pendent states and had wreaked havoc 
in Arab countries. The echo of this shift 
is seen on the Arab streets, where the 
people who took to the streets did not 
express ideological demands: they did 
not voice claims for socialism, Arabism, 
Islamism, liberalism, or communism; but 
rather for justice, dignity, rule of law, and 
political participation. Furthermore, the 
shift from ideology to critique is also due 
to a growing need in the post-indepen-
dence era to relate ideas to concrete re-
alities, to critically appropriate ideas by 
contextualizing and historicizing them. 
This shift can also be seen as a move from 
a “thought of authenticity,” seeking a firm 
affirmation of a solid self, to “authentic 
thinking,” understood to be indispens-
able for a true sense of self—thus making 
critique the major pillar of authenticity.
c) The Shift Away from Ideology 
The intellectual scene witnessed, particu-
larly in the more critically inclined part of 
it, a shift away from nationalism, Islamism, 
Marxism, and Baathism, toward critique, 
democracy, and fundamental human and 
citizen rights—in other words, to what is 
demanded by Arabs on Arab streets to-
day.
From today’s vantage point, it is difficult 
to imagine that once upon a time, in the 
1950s and ’60s, Marxist ideas and orga-
nizations were the most popular ones in 
the Arab world, and that Marxist parties 
in Sudan, Iraq, Syria and Egypt attracted 
large numbers of Arabs who invested 
their sincere beliefs and commitments 
into the causes of justice, equality, libera-
tion, and progress. These ideas and or-
ganizations did not wither away naturally, 
but were systematically annihilated by 
post-independence regimes which rec-
ognized in them one of the most—if not 
the most—powerful oppositional forces. 
Marxist party members and sympathiz-
ers were persecuted, intimidated, ar-
rested, jailed for years, tortured, forced 
to disavow their beliefs, executed, and 
exiled. These regimes also repressed the 
other major oppositional force, namely 
the Islamist one, however in a more Ma-
chiavellian way: not only by using force to 
silence it, but also by instrumentalizing it 
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to further crush the left. Indeed, they al-
lowed Islamists to overpower leftists in 
various social organizations, and in the 
process led to the Islamicization of soci-
ety in the name of faith and authenticity. 
Inevitably, this gave the Islamists increas-
ing popular legitimacy and made them 
into an even more formidable challenge 
to the regimes. By the early ’80s, the Arab 
left had become a shadow of itself, totally 
marginalized and disempowered. Not 
only did the regimes succeed in crushing 
this once vigorous movement, but they 
also discredited many of its principles 
by claiming to rule in its name. Indeed, 
the Iraqi and Syrian Baath parties were 
supposed to be socialist, secularist, and 
progressive parties dedicated to justice, 
equality, and unity. Moreover, such as-
pirations to justice and liberation kept 
motivating those who now housed them 
in another movement and another ide-
ology—that of Islamism, as in the case of 
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Some have found 
this migration between such different and 
even opposite political currents to be a 
totally bewildering aberration. But it can 
make sense when one keeps in mind the 
basic vested aspirations in each commit-
ment. Furthermore, the final blow to the 
Arab left, like to other leftist movements 
around the world, came with the demise 
of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth 
century. Whether and how the current 
uprisings will reinvigorate the Arab Left 
remains to be seen. What is certain is that 
these uprisings were not led by leftist ide-
ologies and organizations as such.
Another ideology that was popular mid-
twentieth-century was that of pan-Ara-
bism. This expressed the yearning for 
might and progress through the unifica-
tion of an Arab world that was, according 
to this view, fragmented and divided by 
Western powers. It represented an affir-
mation of cultural identity and the quest 
for a political expression of that identity. 
Unfortunately, all attempts at unification 
failed, and Arab unity remains an unful-
filled aspiration. This failure had been 
regularly lamented by politicians, think-
ers, and people in general, but with time 
the project lost much of its attraction. On 
the one hand, it felt too remote to be 
credible, and on the other hand the reali-
ties of existing states absorbed too much 
of the people’s thoughts and efforts for 
them to be concerned with some fictive 
state to come. Again, it is certainly not a 
call for pan-Arabism that moved Arab 
demonstrators in the various Arab coun-
tries to take to the streets since late 2010. 
But for numerous Arabs, the uprisings 
made the bond between different Arab 
countries real for the first time. People 
identified spontaneously with each other, 
empathizing with causes and struggles 
that apparently had so much in com-
mon due to the common ills of so many 
of these Arab states. Arab satellite televi-
sion broadcasters had since the mid-’90s 
created a common space of news, enter-
tainment, and debate, and this played a 
major role in connecting people during 
the uprisings. Before that period of me-
dia globalization, Arabs were confined to 
their official state media, in an Arab world 
where the circulation of ideas, people, 
and goods was strictly controlled and 
limited. But if the satellite broadcasters 
succeeded, it is because these people 
shared so much: linguistically, culturally, 
and politically. Whereas pan-Arabism had 
presented this commonness in an author-
itarian, undemocratic manner, this more 
recent connectedness and empathy was 
natural, spontaneous, and free. Following 
news of the uprisings introduced people 
to the geography of their environment, as 
well as to its various ethnic, religious, and 
regional components. The pan-Arab idea 
of the Arab world was moreover a ho-
mogenizing one that recognized only the 
Arab language, Arab ethnicity, and Islam 
as “the” constituents of this world, exclud-
ing the Amazigh, Kurdish, Christian, and 
other minorities that populate it. The ’90s 
had started to witness a revision of this 
exclusive understanding of Arabism. The 
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recent uprisings certainly brought about 
unprecedented, vivid pan-Arab aware-
ness. It will be interesting to see whether 
and how this will affect pan-Arabism, and 
what place it will give non-Arab elements 
and minorities.
Obviously the dominant ideology of the 
last few decades has been Islamism—yet 
curiously it, too, was absent from the up-
rising banners. Interestingly, it did win 
free elections in Egypt and Tunisia, prov-
ing to be a serious popular movement, 
but not the unquestionable ideology of 
the absolute majority. This movement 
will now be practicing politics, after it was 
banned from it for decades. Its discourses 
and its social organizations will have to 
be confronted with the political realities 
of its countries and regions, and engage 
with youth that is no longer receptive to 
authoritarianism and autocracy. What 
this new phase will do to the movement 
itself—to the discourses, promises, and 
societies in which people have become 
open political actors—remains to be seen. 
Some analysts have been talking of post-
Islamism in the region—be it in Iran, Turkey 
or other parts of the Arab world—a post-
Islamism that is neither anti-Islamism nor 
non-Islamism, but a transformed Islamism 
that is seriously concerned with democ-
racy.3 
So on the one hand these ideologies—
namely communism and socialism, Arab 
nationalism, and Islamism to some ex-
tent—lost their energy, credibility, and 
popularity over the course of the last five 
decades. On the other hand they also lost 
their relevance to critical thinking, which 
was keener on claiming liberties and re-
appropriating critical faculties than on 
seeking ready-made holistic worldviews. 
It is those liberties and faculties that peo-
ple ended up claiming in their demon-
strations, rather than any of the holistic 
doctrines of salvation.
d) Vanguard Leadership
By the end of the twentieth century, criti-
cal Arab thinkers had abandoned the 
claim of an avant-garde role for them-
selves, rather seeing the importance of 
engaging the people as the main actors 
for much-needed change—people who 
manifested themselves indeed as the 
main actor and guarantor of change in 
the current uprisings. 
Already before the current uprisings, many 
critical Arab thinkers had relinquished a 
leadership role vis-à-vis their societies. In 
a series of interviews conducted by the 
pan-Arab daily al-Hayat in 2006 and 2007, 
Arab thinkers were asked about their un-
derstanding of their role and responsibil-
ity in dealing with the many challenges of 
their countries. Many of the interviewees, 
including Samir Amin, Tahar Labib, Wa-
jih Kawtharani, Burhan Ghalioun, Turki 
Hamad, ʿAbdallah Ghadhdhami, Nawal 
el-Saadawi, and ʿAli Harb called upon 
thinkers to focus on their scholarly work 
and produce serious knowledge in a re-
gion that suffered severely from weak 
production of rigorous scholarly knowl-
edge, both on itself and about the rest of 
the world. They deplored the poor con-
ditions of knowledge production in the 
Arab world, and also the phenomenon 
of mediocre scholars turned into media 
“experts,” lured by fame and money of-
fered to them. Most of them saw the ab-
sence of freedom and multiple obstacles 
to the free circulation of ideas, publica-
tions, and people as among the most se-
rious impediments to their work. Kuwaiti 
sociologist Muhammad al-Rumaihi ironi-
cally stated that the biggest “cultural” in-
stitution that grew after 1967 was that of 
censorship. Another major predicament 
they saw in knowledge production and 
dissemination was illiteracy and the di-
sastrous deterioration of education. Also 
despair and nihilism due to economic 
crises, developmental failures, and unre-
solved conflicts in the region were diffi-
cult challenges for their attempts at cre-
ating meaning and validating norms. The 
violence that engulfed the region made 
the defense of life-affirming ideas and 
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values a difficult task. It also made people 
more attracted to salvational doctrines 
than sobering critique. Many left-leaning 
thinkers, such as Georges Tarabichi, said 
they found themselves alienated from 
their societies, having failed to commu-
nicate with them, unlike Islamists who 
succeeded in holding a discourse that 
culturally and psychologically speaks to 
the people. The lesson to be drawn for 
them was to abandon the avant-garde 
leadership conception of their role, and 
to engage people in their concerns and 
activities, without however giving in to 
populism. The mood clearly was no lon-
ger of pontification, paternalization, and 
illumination, rather of modest listening 
and engaging in a common struggle for 
liberty and democracy. This new position-
ing of intellectuals was already present in 
some of the movements preceding the 
current uprisings, such as the Egyptian 
Kifaya movement against the passing of 
power from Mubarak father to Mubarak 
son, in which a number of intellectuals 
were involved but no “star intellectual” 
postured as the main inspirer or leader of 
the movement. Similarly, in the Tunisian, 
Egyptian, and Syrian uprisings, numerous 
intellectuals were involved in the dem-
onstrations and multi-faceted advocacy 
activities, without standing as “leading” 
figures of the movements.
Intellectuals and the Arab Uprisings
My claim here is that in the dark decades 
following independence, Arab critical 
thinkers were very much in tune with 
their societies. Their work reflected on 
the deep discontent that they shared with 
their people, and articulated conceptually 
the ills they all suffered from: state repres-
sion, arbitrary rule, corruption, injustice, 
pauperization, social polarization, poor 
health, mediocre education, political 
disenfranchisement, and the absence of 
liberties and rights. They named and de-
nounced these ills with sobriety, honesty, 
and consistency, in times of great despair 
and ideological disarray. They manifested 
intellectual lucidity and moral courage 
despite the prevailing helplessness and 
resignation. Their merit was to engender 
clarity where fear, state propaganda, and 
big money presses had filled the space 
with misleading discourses. They contin-
ued their quiet and meticulous work of 
self-reflection from the margins to which 
the powers-to-be had confined them, in 
environments of growing illiteracy and 
poverty. They continued to write, publish, 
and speak in the pockets of freedom that 
were left open to them; they managed to 
smuggle some of their forbidden films to 
eager audiences, to have their plays put 
on stages when censorship got occasion-
ally distracted, to have some newspaper 
supplements publish their articles (in the 
Lebanese dailies al-Nahar and al-Safir, 
and the London-based pan-Arab papers 
al-Hayat and al-Quds al-ʿArabi to name a 
few), and to have some presses publish 
their books. Clearly, the dissemination of 
their ideas was severely hampered by all 
these restrictions. Moreover, the nature of 
their work made it not destined for a mass 
readership, and they themselves were 
not mass-media figures—although they 
were not obscure figures either. Many of 
them were prominent men and women 
of academia, the arts, and the press—but 
none of them could mobilize masses. 
One has to add here the work of popular 
poets such as Nizar Qabbani (1923-1998) 
and Mahmud Darwish (1941-2008), who 
through their political poetry resonated 
with millions of Arabs, and that of popular 
cartoonists who expressed (and still do) 
most sharply the bitterly lived realities of 
the people, namely the work of Palestin-
ian cartoonist Naji al-ʿAli (born 1938, as-
sassinated in London 1987) and the work 
of Syrian caricaturist ʿAli Farzat (born in 
Syria 1951, recently beaten by Syrian re-
gime forces).
Given the overwhelming ʿajz of this dark 
fin de siècle, nothing could foretell the 
outburst of such a popular capacity to rise 
and force change. No one could suspect 
the explosion of the accumulated ʿajz in 
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an irrepressible determination to break 
free from the status quo. This was certainly 
not caused by those critical writings men-
tioned above. Ideas alone could not bring 
about this kind of defiance. The élan had 
to come from other quarters of human re-
action, namely from the intolerable pains 
of suffering injustice and brutality over a 
long period of time. So one cannot speak 
of a causal connection between the work 
of the critical thinkers and the recent pop-
ular revolts. My thesis is that the demands 
expressed in the uprisings were concep-
tualized over the years by those thinkers. 
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